grant of ¥300,000 (approximately US$3,000) per person to some immigrant workers in order to facilitate their return to their homelands. 1 The offer was directed at immigrant workers of Japanese descent-colloquially known as Nikkei-jin -who had been encouraged to come and work in Japan in the 1990s from Peru, Brazil and other parts of Latin America ('Axed Brazilians, Peruvians to be paid to leave . The community of these immigrants and their families has thus existed in Japan for close to two decades.
The report that Japan was trying to find a way of encouraging these immigrants to return to their countries of birth suggests that we are entering a new iteration of the cycles of labour mobility between Japan and other nations. Recent trends in labour mobility reflect Japan's place as one of the most influential economies in the Asia-Pacific regioneven in the wake of the global financial crisis -and as one of the magnets for documented and undocumented migrant labour. The changing fortunes of these labour immigrants of Japanese heritage also, however, need to be placed in the context of a longer history of emigration and immigration, dating back to the nineteenth century. The 'Nikkei' immigrants are the descendants of those who left Japanese rural areas in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to escape rural poverty, with the encouragement of the governments of the time (Befu 2000: 17-40; Dresner 2008: 66-94; Quan 2004: 339-367 ). In 2007 it was estimated that there were 2.15 million registered foreign residents in Japan, nearly twice as many as in 1990. This figure would include these recent immigrants, but also the (non-naturalised) descendants of Korean and Taiwanese families who have been in Japan since the colonial period (Daimon 2009) , and smaller numbers of skilled sojourners, trainees and international students. There are an estimated 110,000 unregistered foreign residents ('Editorial: The foreign residents among us ' 2009) . 2 Several other recent reports further suggest that this first decade of the twenty-first century is an important period in the management of borders in contemporary Japan.
There have been controversies concerning requests for permanent residency by some who had originally entered illegally or had overstayed (Fukue and Matsutani 2009; '10-year overstayer is granted new visa ', 2009) . Other controversies concern the nationality of descendants of Japanese fathers and non-Japanese mothers (Agnote 2008a; ; and there has been discussion of whether to remove restrictions on dual nationality ). We have also seen new international agreements directed at encouraging the temporary migration of care workers to Japan from Indonesia and the Philippines (Agnote 2008b ; Kaneko 2009 , Itô 2008 Itô in press) . Meanwhile, the government is gradually reforming its border control regime. In this article, I will consider these recent issues of border control, and how they interact with the management of the labour market and the management of social policy issues.
These matters of border control interact with current social issues involving the changing demography of Japan, a changing labour market, and changing economic relationships with other countries in the region. Japan is now facing a rapidly aging population with the highest life expectancy in the world, a birthrate well below replacement level, and a shrinking population. Smaller families find it difficult to provide primary care for the sick, the elderly and those with disabilities, and the welfare system is stretched to the limit. At the same time, Japanese people, until recently, almost universally saw themselves as 'middle-class', and have been unwilling to undertake types of work regarded as 'manual labour' or 'unskilled labour'. 3 Thus, as I shall argue below, the management of border control is also related to the labour market, the management of welfare, and the state of the caring professions. This is a range of policies which I would like to refer to as involving the management of bodies. This article thus focuses on 'the management of borders' and the 'management of bodies' in contemporary Japan.
The 'management of bodies' could also be framed in terms of Foucault's concept of 'biopower'. As biopower, individuals are mobilised by the state as resources: as workers, as citizens, and as family members responsible for the reproduction of the population (Foucault 1980: 138-145; Schirato and Webb 2003: 135) . In the current age of economic globalisation, however, the management of biopower is also a matter which crosses national boundaries. Global corporations attempt to maximise profits through accessing cheaper labour power. Or, as Hancock et al explain, 'transnational capitalism demands flexible bodies for flexible accumulation ' (2000: 1) . While workers attempt to maximise their income through crossing national borders, nation-states attempt to regulate these flows through border controls (Mackie and Stevens 2009: 260 ).
Japan's Demographic Challenge
In April 2009, a Japanese government white paper reiterated that 'Japan is graying and its birthrate is falling faster than any other country in the world' ('Japan birthrate fall from the taxes of a shrinking labour force) but also a matter of labour (of finding the labour power to deal with the physical care of the aged). 4 As Huguet points out, in order to improve this ratio, Japan would need to raise its birth rate, raise its retirement age, and allow substantial increases in the immigration of people of working age (Huguet 2003: 107-124) . The government's efforts to raise the birth rate have been ineffective, (Roberts 2002 ) and the crisis in elder care has been dealt with by encouraging the immigration of workers on a temporary basis, as will be discussed below.
Imagine a married woman in her fifties, whose husband is the primary breadwinner. 5 It is likely that her parents and her husband's parents will be alive and in Until the 1990s, it seemed unimaginable that Japan might consider the use of the services of immigrant workers in order to deal with the crisis in elder care. In the first decade of the twenty-first century, however, this has become a reality. As there are not enough Japanese workers willing or able to engage in caring labour, it has become necessary to bring in immigrant workers who are qualified as nurses or carers.
Nevertheless, the scale and forms of such immigration are being closely controlled and monitored. At the same time, there has been a decline in the kind of manufacturing and labouring jobs which have been filled by short-term labour immigrants in recent years.
Managing the Labour Market
In the latter decades of the twentieth century, the Japanese economy gradually (Statistics Bureau, Japan, 2009: 132) .
From the 1970s to the 1990s, a large part of manufacturing production was moved offshore, in search of looser environmental controls, weaker labour unions, and cheaper labour power. Some sectors of manufacturing, involving sub-contracting and sub-subcontracting to the large industrial conglomerates, did, however, stay onshore, and this work was variously undertaken by married women in part-time or casual positions, rural labour on a seasonal basis, and from the 1980s by immigrant labour. Some immigrants worked legally as kenshûsei (trainees) on limited term contracts and short-term visas, while others entered on tourist visas and overstayed. The construction industry also became reliant on (largely undocumented) immigrant labour in these years (Yamanaka 2000: 63) . The savings to employers are not necessarily in wages. Rather, irregular workers 'cost their employers significantly less because they do not receive the numerous expensive benefits, entitlements and job security that Japanese regular employees do' (Yamanaka 2000: 87-88) .
For the last decade, however, the automotive industry has been in crisis. This crisis has been reflected in a number of mergers between Japanese and European automobiIe manufacturers. This has also resulted in the hiring of managers from overseas, such as the There is an implicit privileging of mental labour over physical labour encoded in immigration policy -a mind/body split whereby intellectual, white collar work is given recognition, but not manual and physical labour, and certainly not sexual labour (Mackie 2002: 200-229) . Some élite white-collar workers enter Japan temporarily on working visas, and this is recognised under the rubric of 'internationalisation' (kokusaika). These élite white-collar workers have much in common with the élite middle-class white-collar Japanese worker, except for their nationality and lineage. The entry of such workers was facilitated by amendments to the Immigration Control Law (Shutsunyûkoku oyobi Nanmin Nintei Kanri-hô) in 1990, at the same time as it became possible for those of Japanese descent to enter Japan to work, albeit generally in less privileged occupations.
The Japanese Department of Immigration does not explicitly permit immigration for the purpose of engaging in unskilled labour. There are, however, several major loopholes. Students may engage in limited part-time work, and some workers enter the country under the category of 'trainees' (kenshûsei). As noted above, a special category for those of Japanese ancestry has brought immigrants from Japanese-descended communities in Latin America to Japan as workers. Despite their Japanese ancestry, these workers often came to Japan with limited Japanese-language skills and cultural competence, and thus were relegated to relatively unskilled occupations.
It is seen as 'natural' that Japanese young people are increasingly reluctant to engage in manual work, and that these places may be taken by immigrant workers, even if illegally. The phrase 'difficult, dirty and dangerous' (kitsui, kitanai, kiken) used to describe these marginalised occupations aligns them with the abject (Mackie 1998: 45-64) . The relegation of these marginalised occupations to the least privileged members of society, including immigrant labour, allows members of the Japanese 'mainstream' to imagine themselves as fully middle-class, as engaged in white-collar 'mental' work rather than physical or unskilled work. The mind/body split is built into the very structures of modern capitalist societies like Japan, and is intimately entwined with class structure. The most prestigious occupations are those which have more of a mental component and less of a physical component. The use of immigrant labour in particular occupations means that these occupations come to be associated with particular ethnic groups, or, in other words: are ethnicised. This is the context for the immigration of workers of Japanese descent from the 1990s (Yamanaka 2000: 81) .
While much of the discussion of immigrant labour in other parts of Asia has focused on domestic work (Piper 2004: 216-231; Moya, 2007: 559-579; Misra and Merz, 2005: 9) , Japan is relatively distinctive in not importing large numbers of domestic workers. The explanation for these distinctive patterns of immigration lies in the connection between the gendered division of labour, the labour market and demography.
In Singapore, for example, middle-class educated women have been encouraged to stay in the full-time workforce in élite occupations, thus necessitating the employment of domestic labour (Cheah 2006: 178-266) . income distribution in Japan also means that it is rarely feasible to employ domestic help.
With the aging of the population and the plummeting birthrate, the pressing need is for the care of the aged and infirm.
Because of the official prohibition on importing 'unskilled' labour, it is illegal to import labour for the purpose of domestic work, although anecdotal evidence suggests that some families are finding ways to employ overseas domestic workers. In one loophole, diplomatic personnel may employ domestic workers or chauffeurs who speak English, and this allows them to employ overseas workers. While such workers have a legitimate visa status, their home-based work does not come under the purview of the Labour Standards Law (Rôdô Kijun Hô, 1947) , the legislation which regulates the working conditions of regular workers in workplaces such as offices and factories. 
Managing Borders
The boundaries of the nation-state are policed through laws on immigration, the ability of migrant workers to claim rights under these conventions will often depend on the advocacy of non-government organisations (Piper 2004: 22) .
It should be noted that the boundaries of nationality and the geographical borders of the nation-state are not identical. Because nationality is determined on the jus sanguinis (bloodline) principle rather than the jus soli (place of birth) principle, it is possible to be born and raised within the physical boundaries of the nation-state without having Japanese nationality. Until 1985, the Nationality Law was based on patriarchal principles.
It was assumed in Japan, as in many other countries, that fathers had the right to determine the nationality and domicile of family members. Only men had the right to pass on Japanese nationality to their children, and the provisions for naturalisation of foreign spouses were different for men and women. This became an issue after several cases of stateless children (with Japanese mothers and non-Japanese fathers) appeared.
These provisions were modified in the mid-1980s, as the Nationality Law was overhauled in preparation for Japan's ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms Currently, the systems of registering and tracking Japanese nationals and the systems of registering and tracking non-Japanese residents are separate. Japanese nationals have a family register entry, a resident registration and a nationality. NonJapanese residents have an alien registration card (Chapman 2008: 423-443) . Under a
Bill for the amendment of the Nationality Law and the Immigration Control Law (promulgated 15 July 2009), the two systems will be brought into line, and non-Japanese residents will have a residence (zairyû) card which will allow for closer tracking of their movements through the resident registration system. The new registration system will be administered by the Justice Ministry at national level rather than by local governments as occurs in the present system. While this appears neutral on the surface, in that the treatment of Japanese and non-Japanese residents will be more similar, advocates for immigrants fear that the result will be increased surveillance of non-Japanese residents 
Labour immigrants of Japanese descent
In 1990, the Immigration Control Act was modified to allow descendants of Japanese emigrants to enter Japan for up to three years, in a long-term resident category In the 1990s, the temporary immigration of people of Japanese descent was seen as a more acceptable way of dealing with labour shortages than inviting 'guest workers' with no apparent ties to the Japanese nation-state. Although the Japanese heritage of such immigrants was probably expected to cut down on problems generated by perceptions of difference, local communities soon found they had to deal with contact between groups with different social and cultural expectations, while schools needed to address the necessity of multilingual and multicultural education for the children of these families.
The co-existence of the descendants of Japanese emigrants reinforces the primacy of Japanese lineage, but also has the potential to undermine the naturalised assumption that However, the national unemployment peaked at 5.7 per cent during 2009, and the automobile industry was particularly hard hit. This industry is concentrated in central Japan in Aichi prefecture, where an estimated 220,000 registered foreigners reside (Yamanaka 2000: 80) .
In April 2009 the government offered ¥300,000 to any unemployed immigrant worker of Japanese ancestry who wished to leave the country, and ¥200,000 each to family members, on the condition that they would not return to Japan. The government also allocated ¥1.08 billion for training, including Japanese-language lessons, for the workers of Japanese ancestry ('Axed Brazilians, Peruvians to be paid to leave . Some local governments also started support programs for such workers. 
Transnational Care Work
Recent policies which provide insurance for the costs associated with the care of the aged attempt to come to terms with the social requirements of a population where the aged comprise an ever-increasing proportion of the population (Kaigo Hoken Hô/Law
Concerning Insurance for Nursing Care, 1997 Care, , amended 2000 . As a supplement to the care provided by family members, volunteers, paid carers and nursing professionals, the Japanese government is moving slowly on bringing in care workers from overseas. This is being managed by bilateral agreements with Indonesia and the Philippines. For those who started work in Japan during 2009, there were reports of language problems and issues in adjusting to a different workplace environment. All of the care workers admitted so far will work in hospitals and nursing facilities and not in private care. They will be expected to pass exams in three or four years in order to gain qualifications if they wish to stay on in Japan. They could in some ways, then, be seen as a specific form of 'trainee'. They have been provided with a six-month language course which allows them to communicate in basic spoken Japanese, but much more specialised language training will be necessary in order to tackle the national caregiver qualifying examinations. The second group of Indonesian workers, up to about 800 nurses and caregivers, were planned to arrive at the end of 2009 (Kaneko 2009 ).
The agreement with the Philippines ( In the Philippines, more than 400 nursing schools are producing more nursing graduates than can be employed by hospitals and rest homes. Many of the fresh graduates are pinning their hopes on finding a job overseas. For those from the Philippines, who have been educated in English, however, other countries, such as U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Britain may seem more accessible than Japan. Concern has also been expressed internationally about the exodus of medical professionals from developing countries to first world countries. This has prompted the World Health Organisation to develop the Global Code on International Recruitment of Health Personnel (Cheng 2009, pp. 111-112) . As wealthy first world countries seek personnel from around the world to care for the bodily needs of their citizens, third world countries increasingly suffer from a lack of medical professionals, nurses and care workers to look after the needs of their own populations.
Conclusions
The issues currently being faced in contemporary Japan are a harbinger of issues soon to be faced by other advanced economies which are characterised by rising life expectancy and plummeting birth rates. To trace the circuits of labour mobility in the Asia-Pacific region is also to map the patterns of economic inequality in the region. The mobilisation of people as workers, citizens and members of reproductive families has hitherto mainly been considered within the frame of the nation-state, with reference to Foucault's concept of 'biopower ' (1980: 138-145) . Globalisation, however, prompts us to consider questions of biopower on a regional and global scale, transcending the scale of the nation-state. The management of labour power, the management of populations and the management of care for the bodies of individuals also need to be considered in a transnational frame (Mackie and Stevens 2009: 269) . Global corporations attempt to maximise profits through accessing cheaper labour power, while workers attempt to maximise their income through crossing national borders. Meanwhile, governments try to find ways of providing care for aging populations. Some who cross borders undertake occupations characterised as 'dirty, difficult and dangerous', while others cross borders to take care of the bodies of others in nursing, caregiving or domestic labour. Nation-states attempt to regulate these flows through border controls. National governments like Japan, however, struggle to manage a labour market which is stratified and segmented according to gender, class, caste, ethnicity and nationality. Indeed, this segmentation is in part attributable to the ad hoc decisions on recruiting labour power through specific bilateral agreements. The body comes into play in distinguishing between prestigious, skilled occupations and less prestigious ones which are seen as unskilled and often seen as involving physical or manual labour. The body also comes into play in the need to provide care for those who are aging or infirm. The case studies in this article demonstrate that the management of border control and the management of the labour market are ultimately concerned with the management of bodies.
